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Introduction
The communications world is changing, and packet-switched
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networks are taking over. Traditionally, telephone networks have relied on
a "circuit-switched" architecture-that is, when one user makes a call to
another, a circuit within the network is opened and dedicated to that call
for as long as the call lasts.' In the 1960s, however, scientists began
developing "packet-switching" techniques for communicating information.
In packet-switching, the information (a telephone conversation, video clip,
computer program, newspaper article, or something else) is sliced up into
small packets, each carrying its own copy of the destination address. The
packets travel individually to their destination, not necessarily over the
same route, and are reassembled in proper sequence when they arrive.
Packet-switching is the way the Internet works.2
The traditional communications world relies on distinct
infrastructures for each communications service. Voice travels over a
nationwide wired, intelligent, circuit-switched network, with a single 64
Kilobytes per second (Kbps) voice channel set aside for each call. Video
moves over a separate system of terrestrial broadcast stations,
supplemented by coaxial cable or hybrid fiber-coax networks carrying
video programming from a cable headend to all homes in a given area.
Data is piggybacked onto the voice network via an awkward kluge, under
which the information is converted from digital to analog form and back
again.
But digitization and packet-switching have the potential to change
that traditional design. One can convert any information-be it voice,
video, text, or data-into digital form. Packet-switching, with or without
the use of Internet Protocol (IP),3 enables the transmission of that digitized
information across different networks without regard to the underlying
network technology.4 This means that the digitized information
corresponding to any service can be transmitted over any physical
infrastructure--copper wires, fiber, hybrid fiber-coax, microwave, direct
broadcast satellites or carrier pigeon.5 Proprietors of copper (or hybrid
fiber-coax, or wireless) infrastructure can offer services not previously
associated with those physical facilities, and new services can be
I This is oversimplified; time-division multiplexing techniques allow multiple calls to
share a given circuit. Even if multiplexing techniques are used, it remains the case that each call has a
fixed share of network resources allocated to it for the duration of the call. See HARRY NEWTON,
NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 728-29 (14th ed. 1998).
2 See id. at 527.
3 See generally Information Servs. Inst., University of S. Cal., Internet Protocol: DARPA
Internet Program Protocol Specification (RFC 791) (Sept. 1981) <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/rfc791 .txt>.
4 See David S. lsenberg, The Dawn of the Stupid Network, ACM NETWORKER 2.1, Feb.-
Mar. 1998, at 24, available at <http://www.isen.com/papers/Dawnstupid.html>.
5 See David Waitzman. A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams on Avian
Carriers (RFC 1149) (Apr. 1, 1990) <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1 149.txt>. Carrier pigeons are
appropriate only for applications tolerating extremely high latency.
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delivered, via the Internet, over any physical facilities supporting high-
speed data transmission.
Both local exchange carriers and cable operators are now entering the
market to provide high-speed data services. Consumers with Internet
access can engage in real-time voice transmission via IP. Cable operators
are planning to use packet-switching to provide voice telephony over cable
facilities.7 New services, including video, can be offered over various
facilities; all that is necessary is bandwidth. And an increasing number of
firns are designing nationwide, packet-switched, backbone networks to
carry that traffic.' These networks are not designed to support a particular
service; they carry whatever information is necessary for the service the
consumer wants.
These developments, however, give rise to a regulatory dilemma.
American communications law has developed along service-specific lines,
with complex and distinct regulatory structures covering telephony (wired
and wireless), broadcasting, cable television, and satellites. It has so far
left IP transmission largely unregulated. As those technologies converge,
we need to figure out what to do with the old regulatory structures.
In this Article, I will focus on one aspect of that problem: To what
extent should (or can) we impose legacy telephone regulation on IP
networks? As a broad-brush matter, it seems plain that it would be a Very
Bad Idea either (1) to impose such regulation, or (2) not to impose it.
Imposing legacy regulation on IP networks seems like a bad idea because
that regulation was not designed for those networks. It was developed to fit
a circuit-switched world, served mostly by monopoly telephone service
providers, and it is characterized by extensive cross subsidies and a general
disregard of innovation and competitive markets. Not imposing regulation,
though, seems untenable as well: IP and conventional networks are
merging. To maintain extensive regulation of the circuit-switched world
and minimal regulation of the IP world will simply invite arbitrage, and
will undercut the legitimate policy goals of the old system.
This problem is made more difficult by the snarl of cross subsidies
that comprise much of modem telephone regulation. Telephone pricing
6 Thus, a telephone company recently announced plans to offer 80 channels of cable
programming over copper pair, using rate-adaptive digital subscriber line (DSL) technology. See Fred
Dawson, Small Telco Eyes Cable over DSL, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Aug. 31, 1998. US WEST is
seeking cable franchises for video services it plans to offer over a fiber/copper network using DSL.
And various players are offering video over the Internet. See Richard Tedesco, Who'll Control the
Video Streams?, BROADCASTING, Mar. 8, 1999, at 20.
7 See, e.g., John Markoff, In AT&T-TCI Deal, Cost and Logistical Problems, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 1998, at D1.
8 These networks may rely on native IP, like Qwest's, or on Asynchronous Transfer Mode
(a high-speed packet-like transmission technology), like Sprint's planned Integrated On-demand
Network. See Jacob Ward, Sprint's Brave New Network, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD (June 5, 1998)
<http://thestandard.net/articles/display/0,1449,544,00.html>.
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today is characterized by a variety of subsidies: some federal, some state;
some explicit, some implicit. 9 On the federal level, the government
administers explicit subsidies through "universal service" contributions
and disbursements. It implements implicit subsidies through the interstate
access charge system,'0 and through geographic averaging of interstate
long distance rates." States typically administer implicit subsidies via
geographic averaging of local telephone rates, business-to-residential
subsidies, and the pricing of vertical features, intrastate access, and
intrastate tolls. The most important of these is geographic rate averaging:
high-density urban areas, where costs are lower, underwrite the provision
of service to low-density, high-cost rural areas. 2
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must, therefore,
face the following questions: To what extent should the Internet, and IP
networks generally, be brought into the web of subsidies that characterize
much of modern telephone regulation? What are the consequences if they
are not?
In this Article, I will focus my attention on explicit federal universal
service subsidies and, to a lesser extent, on the interstate access charge
system. After providing some background in Part I, I will suggest in Part II
that the distinction between "telecommunications" and "information
service," embedded in current law, cannot coherently be applied to IP-
based services. Rather than attempting to single out "telecommunications"
providers for universal service contribution obligations, it might make
sense to impose those obligations on the owners of the physical
transmission facilities used for the services. In Part III, I will suggest that
in the long run, providers of interstate IP-based services should pay any
congestion costs they impose on the local exchange. Such a step may only
be appropriate, however, in the presence of meaningful competition in the
local market, and only if the failure to require such payments is shown to
distort ISPs' market incentives.
I. Background
This background section begins with a brief description of the
Internet architecture. It then turns to Title II of the 1934 Communications
Act, the charter of U.S. telephone regulation. It describes how the FCC, in
9 "Implicit subsidy," in this context, means that "a single company is expected to obtain
revenues from sources at levels above 'cost' (i.e., above competitive price levels), and to price other
services allegedly below cost." Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 8784
n. 15 (1997) [hereinafter Universal Service Order], appeal pending sub nom. Texas Office of Pub. Util.
Counsel v. FCC, No. 97-60421 (5th Cir. filed June 25, 1997).
10 See 47 C.F.R. Part 69.
11 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(g) (Supp. 111996).
12 See Universal Service Order, supra note 9, 10-12, at 8784.
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implementing the statute, has approached the intersection of federal and
state authority and the intersection of computing and communications
technology. Finally, it discusses the ways in which the 1996
Telecommunications Act has altered those accommodations.
A. Internet Architecture
The Internet is a network of networks, communicating using packet-
switching technology. A key part of that technology is the Internet
Protocol (IP), which provides the intelligence to transmit packets
successfully even if source and destination are on different physical
networks. IP converts multiple physical networks, which may run on
completely different hardware, into a single logical network. Any
computer on any of the underlying networks can thus communicate with
any other.
13
On a more prosaic level, the Internet is a set of computers, packet
routers, and the physical communications paths (such as copper wire, or
fiberoptic cable, or terrestrial wireless, or satellite transmission, or coaxial
cable) connecting them. A packet router is a data communications device
whose job it is to tell packets where to go; each time a packet hits a router,
the router examines that packet's address information and determines
where to send it next.1 4 Typically, each router is connected to at least two
others.' 5 For the most part, the Internet's physical transmission paths are
copper or fiber lines leased from telephone companies or other providers.'
6
All telephone lines are not the same, though. At one extreme is an ordinary
analog voice line, which can be used for data by means of a modem
transmitting information at (for example) a rate of 28.8 Kbps. As one seeks
increasing speed, one might lease data lines from the telephone company
rated at T-1 (1.544 megabytes per second, or Mbps) or T-3 (45 Mbps), or
an OC-3 fiberoptic line (155 Mbps), or an OC-12 (622 Mbps). 17
When I am at home in Ann Arbor, and send an e-mail message to a
Yale Journal on Regulation editor who has an account on the Yale
University system, the packets constituting that message move something
like this: Each packet begins at my home computer, and travels over my
home telephone line to a server belonging to Msen, my Internet service
provider. Msen is in the business of supplying Internet access to residences
13 See Theodore John Socolofsky & Claudia Jeanne Kale, A TCP/IP Tutorial, M 2.5-.7
(RFC 1180) (Jan. 1991) <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcl180.txt>.
14 See Jack Rickard, The Internet-What Is It?, BOARDWATCH MAGAZINE DIRECTORY OF
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS, Winter 1998, at 11-12.
15 See id. at l1.
16 Seeid. at ll-12.
17 See id. at 12. See generally NEWTON, supra note 1, at 695, 696 (describing data
transmission standards).
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and businesses. It has modem banks in two dozen Michigan cities, and
provisions its network using telephone lines leased from companies in the
state. Msen has made the business choice to provide service only in
Michigan, though; its network doesn't extend beyond the state. In order for
my packets to leave Michigan, therefore, Msen must pass them to a
backbone provider. A backbone provider is a firm that owns high-speed
routers physically located in a number of cities across the United States,
and has leased (or constructed) high-speed data lines to connect those
routers.' 8 It thus controls a high-speed interstate data pathway. To get my
packets to Yale University, Msen will most likely pass them via a Detroit
interconnection point to a national backbone provider known as UUNET.
(UUNET is currently a unit of MCI Worldcom.)' 9 UUNET may route the
packets to New York and hand them off to CERFnet, a national backbone
provider purchased last year by AT&T.2° CERFnet would then convey the
packets to the Yale University network in New Haven; that network would
reassemble the packets into my e-mail message and deliver them to the
recipient.
Who pays for all this? Internet service providers, and Internet
backbone providers, interconnect by means of "transit" or "peering"
arrangements.2' Msen pays UUNET for transit. That is, it pays UUNET to
accept traffic coming from Msen's network, and to deliver that traffic
either to a destination on UUNET's own network or to a third network for
ultimate delivery.22 UUNET and CERFnet, by contrast, have a peering
arrangement-that is, each has agreed to deliver traffic to the other, so that
the customers of one network can exchange traffic with the customers of
the other, and neither network pays the other for that service.23 As a
general matter, the major national backbones peer with one another.
Networks that enter into peering arrangements are usually (although not
always) more or less the same size, so that roughly equivalent numbers of
packets flow in each direction.24
18 See Application of Worldcom, Inc. and MCI Communications for Transfer of Control, 13
F.C.C.R. 18,025, 48, at 18106-07 (1998).
19 See BOARDWATCH MAGAZINE QUARTERLY DIRECTORY OF INTERNET SERVICE
PROVIDERS, Winter 1998, at 259.
20 See id. at 221.
21 See Application of Worldcom, Inc. 145, at 18,105-06; Working Party on Telecomm. and
Info. Servs. Policies, OECD, Internet Traffic Exchange: Developments and Policy 14-17 (1998)
<http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/cm/prod/TRAFFIC.html>.
22 See Application of Worldcom, Inc. 148, at 18,106.
23 See id. 145, at 18,105-06; Kenneth Cukier, Peering and Fearing:
ISP Interconnection and Regulatory Issues (visited Apr. 12, 1999)
<http://ksg222.harvard.edu/iip/iicompol/Papers/Cukier.html>.
24 See Cukier, supra note 23; Working Party on Telecomm. and Info. Servs. Policies, supra
note 21, at 14-17. See generally Padmanabhan Srinagesh, Internet Cost Structures and Interconnection
Agreements (visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/works/SinCostSt.html>
(exploring Intemet Service Providers (ISP) cost structures and optimal interconnection arrangements).
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My monthly subscription payment to Msen covers my share of its
costs for interconnection to UUNET and other backbone providers. It also
covers my share of Msen's costs to transport packets within its own
network: that is, capital expenditures for routers, servers, modems and
associated equipment, and monthly payments for leased lines to connect
those pieces of equipment.25
B. Telephone Regulation
All of these relationships developed within the context of a much
older, completely unrelated telephone regulatory system. Federal
regulation of telecommunications began with the Mann-Elkins Act of
1910,26 which subjected telephone and telegraph service to the jurisdiction
of the Interstate Commerce Commission (whose main job was railroad
regulation).27 Twenty-four years later, Title II of the Communications
Act28 moved the job of telecommunications regulation to the new FCC.
Nevertheless, for both the substantive standards applicable to telephone
and telegraph service providers and the procedural mechanisms used to
enforce those standards, Title II looked to then-existing railroad law.29
Title II, as enacted in 1934, regulated the conduct of communications
"common carriers," defined to include any person (other than a
broadcaster) "engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio. 30 Its keystones were requirements that
carriers' rates be embodied in published tariffs3' and be just, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory.32 Carriers were required to interconnect with other
carriers,33 and to obtain agency permission before building or acquiring
new lines.34 The agency had the power to prescribe just and reasonable
25 Finally, it covers costs relating to operations, customer acquisition, and customer service.
See Lee W. McKnight & Brett Leida, Internet Telephony: Costs, Pricing and Policy, 22 TELECOMM.
POL'Y 555, 557-59 (1998); Srinagesh, supra note 24.
26 Act of June 18, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-218, 36 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1934)).
27 Earlier statutes-the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862 and the Post Roads Act of 1866-had
provided for some governmental authority over telegraph lines built with government subsidies or
along public lands. See Kenneth A. Cox & William J. Byrnes, The Common Carrier Provisions-A
Product of Evolutionary Development, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
1934, at 25, 27 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
28 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-76 (1994).
29 See Cox & Byrnes, supra note 27, at 30; Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal
Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, supra note 27, at 3, 5-6.
30 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (Supp. 11 1996).
31 See 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994).
32 See §§ 201(b), 202(a).
33 See § 201(a).
34 See § 214.
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charges,3" to suspend and investigate tariffs,3 6 and to award damages.37 The
FCC administered these provisions with the goals (among others) of
safeguarding against anticompetitive behavior, minimizing the potential
for improper cross subsidization and protecting the quality and efficiency
of telephone service.38 Over time, Congress added new requirements
relating to such disparate issues as carriers' disclosure of private customer
information; 39 obscene or harassing telephone calls;40  the use of
telecommunications services by the hearing-impaired; 41 pay-per-call
services; 42 and facilitation of police eavesdropping.43
1. The Federal-State Divide.
The Communications Act, though, did not arrogate exclusive control
to the FCC. Rather, it divided authority between the national government
and the states: It assigned the FCC authority over interstate
communication, but left to the states regulation of intrastate
communications." Even before the passage of the 1934 Act, it became
clear that this dividing line between federal and state jurisdictions was
problematic. 45 A long-distance call, after all, passes over the network of
the local telephone company serving the caller, and that of the long-
distance company, and that of the local telephony company serving the
called party. What does such a call do to the Act's jurisdictional
boundaries? In Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., the Supreme Court
provided an answer: To the extent that local plant is used for interstate
calling, the Court stated, it is beyond the reach of the state regulator.46 Its
costs relate to "property used in the interstate service," and must be
included in the interstate rate base, under federal control. 47 The cost of
35 See § 205.
36 See § 204.
37 See §§ 206-09.
38 See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations, 72 F.C.C.2d
358, 389-90 (1979).
39 See 47 U.S.C. § 222 (Supp. 11 1996).
40 See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994).
41 See § 225.
42 See § 228.
43 See § 229.
44 See § 152(b).
45 For more recent struggles with that dividing line, see AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities
Board, 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999) (rejecting the argument that FCC rules implementing the local-
competition provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act relate to local-rather than interstate-
communications and are thus beyond federal authority) and Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996, CC Docket Nos. 96-98 & 99-68, 1999 F.C.C. LEXIS 821
(Feb. 26, 1999).
46 Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
47 Id. at 148-49; see also National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d
1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing Smith). In Smith, the Supreme Court reviewed a district court
decision adjudicating the legality of Illinois Bell's Chicago payphone rates. The Court explained that
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local telephone company plant must thus be allocated between the
intrastate and interstate jurisdictions.48
In the wake of Smith v. Illinois Bell, AT&T increased its per-minute
long-distance rates to reflect that portion of local plant costs assigned to
the interstate jurisdiction, and returned the corresponding revenues to the
local companies (who, for the most part, were its subsidiaries, so the
reimbursement was just a division of revenues within the AT&T corporate
family). 49 After the beginning of long-distance competition,50 the new
long-distance carriers came to make similar payments."1 Under FCC rules
promulgated in 1983, AT&T and its competitors each made competitively
neutral "access payments" to the (now independent) local carriers for the
right to originate and terminate traffic on their networks.5 2
As the FCC recognized, though, this impact of Smith v. Illinois Bell
was economically questionable. Local plant costs are for the most part not
traffic sensitive.' That is, the cost of installing, and maintaining, a wire
from an Ameritech central office to my house is the same whether I use
that line five minutes each day or eighteen hours. Yet, under the access-
charge system, those costs were recovered through a per-minute (traffic-
sensitive) charge on long-distance usage. Heavy long-distance users ended
up paying more than the costs they imposed on the network; light users
paid less. This created arbitrage incentives, raising the possibility that
heavy users might turn to solutions in which they bypassed the local
telephone networks entirely when initiating long-distance traffic, avoiding
access charges and shifting those costs onto an ever-shrinking rate base.
Accordingly, the Commission began moving away from the old
structure. In 1983 it ordered that a portion of the local plant costs in the
interstate jurisdiction should be recovered through flat, monthly per-line
charges assessed on all local telephone subscribers. 3 This, the agency
the lower tribunal had erred in including all of Illinois Bell's Chicago property in its rate base. "The
separation of the intrastate and interstate property, revenue and expenses of the Company," it
explained, "is essential to the appropriate recognition of the competent governmental authority in each
field ofregulation." 282 U.S. at 148.
48 See 282 U.S. at 148-51.
49 See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm 'rs, 737 F.2d at 1104 n.3. Where the local
carrier was not affiliated with AT&T, AT&T remitted to it the amounts necessary to recover its
allocated interstate costs, including a return on investment. See Access Charge Reform, 12 F.C.C.R.
15,982, 18, at 15,990-91 (1997).
50 Before the mid-1970s, one could place ordinary long-distance telephone calls only
through AT&T. MCI filed tariffs for its own service in 1974; the D.C. Circuit twice reversed FCC
rulings that would have shut that competition down. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590
(D.C. Cir. 1978); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
51 These were referred to as ENFIA (Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access)
payments. See Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access, 71 F.C.C.2d 440 (1997); see also
Access Charge Reform, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982, 20-21, at 15,991 (1997).
52 See MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, Phase 1, 93 F.C.C.2d (1983) aff'd in relevant part sub
nor. National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs. v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
53 Id.
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reasoned, would be more economically efficient: non-traffic sensitive costs
would be recovered through non-traffic sensitive fees, so that prices would
be based on the true cost characteristics of telephone company plant. At
the same time, the FCC established a Universal Service Fund, to be
supported by the long distance carriers, to subsidize rates in high cost
areas.54 The agency contemplated that over time, it would increase the
monthly per-line charges paid by local telephone subscribers until those
charges covered all local plant costs in the interstate jurisdiction, with the
exception of the costs reimbursed by the Universal Service Fund.5 This
goal proved unrealistic, as the Commission faced complaints that allowing
the flat charges to rise might cause low-income customers to disconnect
their telephone service. 6 Instead, local costs assigned to the interstate
jurisdiction ended up being recovered partly through subscriber line
charges and partly through interstate carriers' access payments.57
2. Computer II
In the meantime, the FCC was forced to revamp the regulatory
structure in an entirely different respect, to confront the growing
interdependence of communication and data processing technologies.58 In
the early days of telecommunications, customers buying telephone or
telegraph service received an integrated communication offering managed
from top to bottom by a service provider. That changed: "In providing a
communications service, carriers [increasingly] no longer control the use
to which the transmission medium is put." 59 Instead, carriers came to offer
transparent communications channels that subscribers could use as they
chose, for the transmission of voice, data, fax or other information.6 ° Users
were able to combine the communications paths provided by telephone
companies with computing power, and thus create new services, such as
voice mail or database access, that they could sell to others. The FCC
54 In addition, in 1985, the Commission established the Lifeline and Link Up programs,
designed to make telephone service affordable for low-income consumers. Subscribers eligible for
Lifeline need not pay the federal subscriber line charge and certain intrastate end-user charges; until
1996, the federal portion of Lifeline was funded through a charge assessed on interexchange carriers.
Link Up pays a portion of eligible subscribers' installation charges and was funded, before 1996, by an
expense adjustment allocating its costs to the interstate jurisdiction. See Universal Service Order,
supra note 9, 9 326-45, at 8952-60.
55 See Rural Tel. Coalition v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1988); National
Ass 'n of Regulatory Util. Comm "rs, 737 F.2d at 1129-30.
56 See Access Charge Reform, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982, T 24, at 15,992-93 (1997).
57 See id.
58 See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communications Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, TT 18-19, at 13-14 (1966).
59 Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Computer
II), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 194, at 419, aff'd sub nom. Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC,
693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
60 See id.
Vol. 16:211, 1999
The Internet and "Telecommunications Services"
recognized, in a landmark 1980 proceeding known as Computer , that it
would be undesirable to subject these new services to the tariffing and
other requirements that were the concomitants of traditional telephone
regulation. Imposing those regulatory burdens would discourage
innovation and distort the new marketplace, as vendors sought to structure
their services so as to avoid coming under the regulatory umbrella. And,
because the markets for the new services were competitive, regulations
primarily intended to restrain market power were unnecessary.'
Accordingly, the Commission announced that it would distinguish
between "basic" and "enhanced" services.62 It limited "basic" transmission
services to the offering of "pure transmission capability over a
communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction
with customer supplied information." 63 By contrast, "any offering over the
telecommunications network which is more than a basic transmission
service" was deemed an "enhanced" service.64 Enhanced services included
services "offered over common carrier transmission facilities" that
"'employ computer processing applications that act on the format, content,
code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted
information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured
information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information. 65
Thus, for example, any service featuring "voice or data storage and
retrieval applications, such as a 'mail box' service," was enhanced.66
Enhanced service providers, the Commission continued, should not
be subject to regulation under Title II of the Communications Act.67
Notwithstanding that any enhanced service by definition had a
communications component, the Commission found that no regulatory
scheme could "rationally distinguish and classify enhanced services as
either communications or data processing, ' 6 and that any attempt to
impose regulation on enhanced services would lead to arbitrage,
inconsistency, and/or inappropriate regulation.69 (There was one major
caveat: Ma Bell and her descendants, when seeking to offer enhanced
services, were subject to a set of rules designed to ensure that they did not
61 See id. 129, at 434.
62 See id. TT 86-118, at 417-30.
63 Id. 96, at 420.
64 Id. $ 97, at 420.
65 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1993).
66 Computer 11, 77 F.C.C.2d 9 97, at 420-21.
67 The agency reasoned that enhanced services involve "communications and data
processing technologies ... intertwined so thoroughly as to produce a form different from any
explicitly recognized in the Communications Act [of 19341," and that enhanced service providers were
not "common carriers" within the meaning of the Act. Id. 99 121-25, at 430-32.
68 Id. I 113, at 428.
69 See id. 99 102-13, at 423-28.
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leverage their monopoly power.)70 That approach was wildly successful in
spurring innovation and competition in the enhanced-services marketplace:
Government maintained its control of the underlying transport, sold
primarily by regulated monopolies, while eschewing any control over the
newfangled, competitive "enhancements."
When the FCC revamped access payments in 1983, it initially took
the position that both basic and enhanced service providers should pay
access charges. Both were "users of access service," in that they
"obtain[ed] local exchange services or facilities which are used.., for the
purpose of completing interstate calls. 71 On reconsideration, though, the
agency abandoned that view. Enhanced service providers, it reasoned,
would experience severe rate shocks if they were to pay the same access
charges as long-distance carriers.72 Accordingly, it exempted enhanced
service providers from any access-charge obligations. Instead, those
charges fell solely on firms offering basic, interexchange services on a
common-carrier basis.73
3. The 1996 Telecommunications Act
Three years ago, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of
1996. This enactment, which significantly rewrote United States
telecommunications law, did not refer to basic and enhanced services at
all; instead, it characterized communications services as either
"telecommunications" or "information service." 74  Congress defined
"telecommunications," though, in a manner strongly reminiscent of the
basic services category, as "the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without
change in the form or content of the information as sent and received., 75 It
defined "information services," in a manner reminiscent of enhanced
services, to include "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring,
70 See id. 201-32, at 461-75; see also Amendments to Sections 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Computer 111), 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987), reconsidered, 3
F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988),further reconsidered, 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989), vacated sub nom. California v.
FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
71 MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, 711 (1983), reconsidered, 97 F.C.C.2d
834 (1984), affd in relevant part sub nom. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737
F.2d 1095 (1984).
72 See MTS & WA TS Mkt. Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d at 715.
73 See National Ass 'n of Regulatory Util. Comm 'rs, 737 F.2d at 1130-36.
74 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (43) (Supp. 11 1996). These categories originated in the 1982
Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) ending the antitrust suit between the United States government
and AT&T. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-32 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 13
F.C.C.R. 11,501, 28, at 11,514, 39-42, at 11,520-22 (1998) [hereinafter Report to Congress on
Universal Service].
75 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (Supp. 11 1996).
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storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications ... ,,76 The FCC concluded that
Congress in the 1996 Act intended "telecommunications" and
"information service" to parallel basic and enhanced services,
respectively."
At the heart of the 1996 Act are provisions intended to enable, for the
first time, competition in the provision of local telecommunications
service. Local telecommunications competition is problematic because the
incumbents already own the key facilities-most importantly, the lines
running from telephone company central offices into every home and
business. Accordingly, section 251 of the 1996 Act requires incumbent
local exchange carriers to make those lines and other facilities available to
competitors at cost, and to allow competitors to place their own equipment
in the incumbents' central offices.78
Robust competition, though, calls for reform of the subsidy system.
Under the pre-1996 status quo, local service was subsidized both
explicitly, through the Universal Service Fund, and implicitly, through
subsidies built into long-distance carriers' access payments. The 1996 Act
directed the FCC to move towards a system under which implicit subsidies
would be eliminated: All federal subsidy support would be distributed
through "specific, predictable and sufficient" explicit mechanisms. 79 The
FCC, accordingly, announced that it would seek to reduce access charges
so that they would cover only the traffic-sensitive costs of interconnection
with the local network (and thus were cost-justified). 80 All other local plant
costs in the interstate jurisdiction, it continued, should be covered either
through flat, per-line charges or through explicit, portable subsidies
provided by a larger, revamped Universal Service Fund. This fund, by the
terms of the 1996 Act, would be supported by equitable and
nondiscriminatory "contributions" (as the statute put it) from interstate
telecommunications carriers.8
As the FCC has implemented the 1996 Act, the Universal Service
Fund has several components. The largest component is the "high cost"
fund. This mechanism subsidizes telephone companies in rural and other
high-cost areas where the costs of the local loop-that "last mile" of the
telephone network running to the individual home or business-are so
76 Id. at § 153(20).
77 Report to Congress on Universal Service, supra note 73, 21, at 11,511.
78 47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. 111996).
79 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5) (Supp. 11 1996). See id. at § 254(e); Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Committee on Conference, H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 131 (1996).
80 See Access Charge Reform, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982, 36-41, at 15,998-16,001 (1997).
81 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (Supp. 11 1996). The statute requires all common-carrier
providers of "telecommunications services," as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 153(46), to contribute, and
authorizes the FCC to require contributions from other interstate telecommunications providers.
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high that many users would drop off the network rather than shoulder the
full costs themselves.8 2 In the second quarter of 1999, interstate
telecommunications carriers will pay about 2.4% of their interstate and
international end-user revenues for that purpose. 3 The Universal Service
Fund also supports the Lifeline and Link Up programs, targeted towards
low-income consumers, 4 and a program designed to connect schools,
libraries, and rural health care providers to the Internet. 5
The FCC's reorganization of the Universal Service Fund following
the 1996 Act greatly increased the scope of explicit federal telephone
subsidies, but it did not increase total support. By imposing a charge to
long-distance carriers that went to a centrally managed fund for
disbursement to local exchange carriers, rather than setting the ratemaking
boundary between federal and state jurisdictions so that long-distance
carriers paid local carriers' inflated fees, the agency simply made explicit
what had previously been implicit. For the most part, the same entities,
interstate telecommunications carriers, still paid the monies in question,
and the same entities, local exchange carriers, still received them.
Congress gave no serious thought to funding universal service from some
other source-for example, out of general tax revenues.
Universal service support mechanisms, under the 1996 Act, may
82 The purposes of high-cost support are contested. When the FCC first created an explicit
universal service fund in 1983, it characterized its universal service policymaking as seeking to avoid
situations in which the price of local telephone service "cause[s] a significant number of local
exchange service subscribers to cancel that service." See MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, 93 F.C.C.2d
241, 266 (1983) (third report & order). This suggests that subsidies in high-cost areas should be high
enough to prevent rural users from dropping off the network, but need not be so high as to equalize
rates in urban and rural areas.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, though, asserts a broader goal, legislating the principle
that universal service support should give rural consumers telecommunications services at rates
comparable to those charged in urban areas. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3) (Supp. 11 1996). Policynakers
in Europe also appear to treat geographical equality of rates as an independent universal service goal.
See, e.g., Barbara Bardski & John Taylor, Understanding Universal Service: A European Perspective 5
(Oct. 3-5, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (it is a central universal service
objective in Europe that telecommunications services, in the early stages of network diffusion, be
available at uniform prices throughout the country).
It is not clear, though, why it should be desirable for government to equalize rural and urban
telecommunications costs, to the extent that unequal costs are consistent with high telephone
penetration in high-cost areas. A wide variety of goods and services, after all, have different costs in
different parts of the country. Achieving a goal of equal prices requires a higher level of subsidies than
would be necessary if government sought to enable high penetration without more.
83 More precisely, they will pay 3% of those revenues to fund the high-cost program
together with the Lifeline and Link Up programs. See FCC Proposed Second Quarter 1999 Universal
Service Contribution Factors, CC Docket No. 96-45 (released Mar. 4, 1999)
<http://www.fcc.gov/DailyReleases/DailyBusiness/1999/db990305/da990455.wp>. About 79% of
that money will go to the high-cost program, and about 21% to the low-income programs. Id.
84 See supra note 54.
85 For the second quarter of 1999, the Universal Service Administrative Company has
estimated $433,300,000 demand (excluding administrative overhead) for the high cost program,
amounting to 49% of all Universal Service Fund expenses. The schools and libraries fund is projected
to make up 36%, and the Lifeline and Linkup programs 14%. See supra note 83.
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support only "telecommunications [that is, basic] services."86 The Act
directs the Commission periodically to reevaluate the definition of
supported telecommunications services in light of "advances in
telecommunications and information technologies and services [taking into
account] the extent to which such telecommunications services are
essential to education, public health, or public safety; have . . . been
subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers; [and] are
being deployed in public telecommunications networks by
telecommunications carriers.""7 The services supported by the Universal
Service Fund today, as defined by the FCC, are no more than single-party
voice grade access to the public switched telephone network, with touch-
tone signaling and access to emergency services, operator services, and
directory assistance.8"
II. The Internet and Universal Service Mechanisms
This section begins by describing the FCC's April 1998 report to
Congress on universal service, 9 which sought to characterize IP-based
service offerings as "telecommunications" or "information service" in
order to assess their regulatory obligations. It urges that that distinction
cannot coherently be applied to IP-based services, and tries to explain
why. It then suggests, and evaluates, an alternative approach.
A. The Report to Congress on Universal Service
After the passage of the 1996 Act, the FCC consistently characterized
IP-based services as information services rather than
telecommunications.9" This meant that the providers of such services were
required neither to pay a percentage of their end-user revenues as a
contribution to the Universal Service Fund nor to comply with any other
Title II obligations.9' The agency was forced to reexamine that judgment,
though, in 1998. Opponents, including Senators Stevens and Bums, were
urging that all IP-based services should be deemed to involve
86 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1996); see also Universal Service Order, supra note 9,
83, at 8822-33 (1997). However, the FCC has interpreted section 254(c)(3) to allow support of other
services in connection with the Schools and Libraries program. See id. % 437-40, at 9009-11.
87 § 254(c)(1).
88 See Universal Service Order, supra note 9, 61, at 8809-10. But see supra note 86
(noting that other services are supported in connection with the Schools and Libraries program).
89 Report to Congress on Universal Service, supra note 74, 32, at 11,511.
90 See Universal Service Order, supra note 8, 439-43 at 9010-12, 787-90, at 9179-81
(1997); see also Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Amendment of the
Comm'n's Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 33, at 6795 (1998).
91 See Report to Congress on Universal Service, supra note 74, 32, at 11,515-16.
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"telecommunications." 92 Those Senators expressed concern that, as
telephone traffic shifted from conventional to IP networks, a failure to
impose universal service charges on IP-based services would endanger
universal service. 93 They crafted an appropriations rider directing the
agency to undertake a detailed review of its definitions of the terms
"information service," "telecommunications," and "telecommunications
service" (among others) in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; the
application of those definitions to "mixed or hybrid services" (referring in
part to Internet access services and IP telephony); and "the impact of such
application on universal service definitions and support.,
94
The FCC duly wrote a report responsive to the appropriations rider.95
It reaffirmed its conclusion that Internet access services were information
services, and the providers of such services therefore were under no
obligation to make direct payments to the universal service fund.96 By
contrast, the Commission classified the provision of pure transmission
capacity to Internet access and backbone providers as
telecommunications.97
But the agency ran into some difficulty when it sought to classify IP
telephony services, which enable real-time voice transmission using
Internet protocols. The FCC first addressed "computer-to-computer" IP
telephony, in which individuals use software and hardware at their
premises to place calls between two computers connected to the public
Internet. In that context, the FCC stated, it need not decide whether there
was "telecommunications" taking place. Title II requirements, including
universal service payment obligations, would not apply in any evenet8
because they apply only to the "provi[sion]" or "offering" of
telecommunications.99 When a user, with an ordinary Internet connection
through her ISP, uses Internet telephony software to enable real-time voice
communication between her computer and that of a fellow enthusiast, the
92 The gist of their argument was that a service should be deemed both telecommunications
and information service if it involved both transmission and manipulation of information. Such a
"hybrid" service, Senators Stevens and Bums argued, should be subject to all Title II obligations,
including those relating to universal service. See Letter from Senators Conrad Bums and Ted Stevens
to William E. Kennard, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (Jan. 26, 1998) (on file with
author); See also Report to Congress on Universal Service, supra note 74, 34-36, at 11,517-19.
93 See Letter from Senators Conrad Bums and Ted Stevens to William E. Kennard, supra
note 92. It is useful to remember that the main function of the universal service fund today is to make
possible the provision of low-cost telephone service in rural and other high-cost areas - a function to
which one would expect Senators Stevens and Bums, who hail from Alaska and Montana respectively,
to be sensitive. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
94 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2521-2522, § 623.
95 Report to Congress on Universal Service, supra note 74.
96 See Id. 73-79, at 11,536-40.
97 See Id. 66-71, at 11,532-36.
98 See id. 87, at 11,543.
99 Id.; see 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(46), 254(d) (Supp. II 1996).
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Internet service provider may not even know that the subscriber's packets
are carrying voice communications. The ISP is not, in any meaningful
sense, "provid[ing]" the voice telephony to that subscriber, and cannot be
made subject to Title II on that basis. 00
The agency was unable to be so definite, though, with respect to
"phone-to-phone" IP telephony services. These are services in which a
customer places an ordinary call to a gateway device that packetizes the
voice signal and transmits it via IP to a second gateway, which reverses the
processing and sends the signal back over the public switched network to
be received by a normal telephone at the terminating end. 01 The
Commission was unable to reach a conclusion as to the proper
classification of such services, stating only that "[t]he record currently
before us suggests that certain forms of 'phone-to-phone' IP telephony
lack the characteristics that would render them 'information services'
within the meaning of the statute, and instead bear the characteristics of
'telecommunications services.,',0 2  It deferred any "definitive
pronouncements" on phone-to-phone IP telephony to an unspecified later
proceeding.
The Report to Congress on Universal Service stressed the FCC's
position that the growth of IP-based services would buttress universal
service, not undercut it. Notwithstanding that Internet access providers are
not required to make universal service payments, they are major users of
telecommunications, and thus make "substantial indirect contributions to
universal service" in the prices they pay to purchase
telecommunications.0 3 The agency did express concern that exemption of
IP telephony providers from universal service contribution requirements
might create an incentive to shift traffic to IP networks, increasing the
burden on the remaining contribution base and undermining universal
service; it found no evidence, however, of "an immediate threat to the
sufficiency of universal service support" at this time.' °4
B. The Breakdown of the Telecommunications/Information Service
Distinction.
It should not be surprising that the FCC had trouble with the
characterization and regulatory obligations of IP telephony providers. On
100 See Report to Congress on Universal Service, supra note 74, 87, at 11,543. If the user
is reaching her ISP over a dial-up telephone connection, then the telephone company is providing her
with telecommunications, but that service is wholly distinct from the IP telephony functionality. See
id. 43, at 11,523 n.87.
101 See id. 184 at 11,541-42, 89 at 11,541-42 & n.188, 11,544.
102 Id. 14, at 11,508.
103 Id. 3, at 11503-04.
104 Id. 98, at 11,548-49.
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one hand, the agency was surely correct that Title II obligations should not
leap into existence simply because a consumer transmits voice, rather than,
say, graphics, over an IP connection. It would be highly problematic to
treat packets differently just because they carried voice rather than some
other sort of information. More importantly, as the Commission noted, in
the simplest "computer-to-computer" case, the customer is buying only
Internet access, rather than an IP telephony service as such. In other IP
telephony services, by contrast, the customer will receive enhanced
functionality that goes beyond the plain-vanilla transmission that
constitutes "telecommunications."
On the other hand, it is also problematic if the provider of a service
that looks and feels to the user just like conventional telephony is subject
to regulation far different from that imposed on conventional telephony
providers. In particular, it would be odd and unhelpful if huge regulatory
distinctions should turn on the question of whether a vendor transports an
intermediate leg of its telephone calls via IP or via some other packet-
oriented technology. Conventional telecommunications carriers are
increasingly using Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), a different
packet-oriented communications technology, in their networks, and it is
completely accepted that the use of ATM to transmit a telephone call does
not render the carrier an information service provider.
To accommodate both of these concerns, one must devise a way to
distinguish those forms of IP telephony that should be subject to regulation
from those that should not. That turns out to be troublesome. The FCC in
the Report to Congress on Universal Service suggested the possibility of
subjecting to Title II regulation IP telephony services in which the
provider
1) . . . holds itself out as providing voice telephony or facsimile
transmission service; 2) ... does not require the customer to use
CPE [customer premises equipment] different from that CPE
necessary to place an ordinary touch-tone call (or facsimile
transmission) over the public switched telephone network; 3) ...
allows the customer to call telephone numbers assigned in
accordance with the North American Numbering Plan, and
associated international agreements; and 4) ... transmits customer
information without net change in form or content. 05
The effect of these requirements would be to regulate an IP telephony
service as telecommunications if the customer's signal travels in
unpacketized form over the public switched network to a gateway (as in
105 Id. 88, at 11,543-44.
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conventional phone-to-phone service), but not if it is packetized in the
customer premises equipment (as in computer-to-computer service).
It is doubtful that this approach would work very well. Consider a
telephone handset that packetizes the customer's voice signal and sends
the packets via IP to an Internet telephony service provider, but that
nonetheless looks and acts, from the user's perspective, like a conventional
telephone. If a service should rely on such equipment, it is not obvious
what policy goals would be served by treating that service differently from
phone-to-phone IP telephony as defined.10 6 Indeed, consider business
telephone users served by switchboard or Centrex systems. Should the
policymaker apply one regulatory paradigm if calls from the business's
telephones are directed to an IP gateway on the public switched network,
but another if the switchboard serving the business itself serves as such a
gateway? If so, why?1
0 7
This difficulty extends beyond the particular definition suggested in
the Report to Congress on Universal Service. What if the phone-to-phone
•IP telephony provider adds just a dab of functionality, such as
automatically recording a conversation and making it available via
streaming audio on a Web site? Or-so as to enable anybody to be a talk
show host-it allows the originator to conduct a conference call with three
or four people, while allowing any member of the public to dial in and
listen?'0 8 Looking to the 1996 Act definitions, it seems plain that the
recording, storage and rebroadcast of the conversation in the first example
involves enhanced functionality and constitutes an "information service;"
the more difficult question is whether we have one service or two. That is,
does the example involve a single information service, or a plain-vanilla
telephony service (telecommunications) combined with a separate
transcription service (information service)? Similarly, the service in the
second example doesn't appear to qualify as "telecommunications," which
the 1996 Act defines as "the transmission, between points specified by the
user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received," because the transmission
doesn't seem to be "among points specified by the user."' 0 9 Yet should we
therefore characterize the overall service as an "information service," or
can one again find a regulated telecommunications service by dividing the
offering into two?
The anomaly here is that it is easy to build functionality into IP-based
106 See id. at 11,636-37 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Furchgott-Roth).
107 Or imagine technology that sets up an IP telephony call from a person's computer to a
corporate call center when that person clicks on a button on the corporation's Web page; whether the
call is characterized as computer-to-phone or computer-to-computer will depend on the fortuitous
consideration of whether the IP gateway serving the call is on- or off-site.
108 These examples are Mike Nelson's.
109 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (Supp. I1 1996).
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services, yet under the "telecommunications"/"information service"
dichotomy, an IP-based service will be deemed "telecommunications," and
thus subject to regulation and universal service obligations, only if it offers
sufficiently crabbed functionality. If the same service gets a software
upgrade, and offers a little more functionality, it becomes an information
service and escapes regulation-unless the new functionality is deemed a
separate service-but we don't have any rules for deciding when that
should be so.110 It is hard to see why any of this makes sense.
IP telephony, further, presents another puzzle: Under the FCC's
current definitions, phone-to-computer and computer-to-phone IP
telephony both appear to be information services. In each case, the
gateway is providing protocol conversion and processing (translating from
unprocessed voice to a series of IP packets, or vice versa); under
established rules, that enhanced functionality pulls the service out of the
realm of simple telecommunications."' Yet if you put those two services
together, what do you have? Any protocol conversion taking place at one
point in the call is undone at another; established law suggests that the
concatenated services are mere "telecommunications.' ' 2 It is hard to
know what to do with that, since the firms providing the two services may
not, in a distributed environment, even be aware of one another.'
1 3
Ultimately, the telecommunications / information service boundary does
not seem to divide up the world of IP-based services in any especially
useful way.
Nor are these problems limited to IP telephony. Consider a rather
more important finding of the Report to Congress on Universal Service:
that Internet access is an information service.' 1  That conclusion seems
110 The genius of Computer H was the recognition that it is difficult to disentangle
communications and computing functionality, and that therefore, at least where the provider does not
own transmission facilities, "offerings ... combining communications and computing components"
should be treated as unitary services and exempted from regulation. Report to Congress on Universal
Service, supra note 74, T 60, at 11, 530. This approach had salutary effects. Yet it has its limits: "It is
plain, for example, that an incumbent local exchange carrier cannot escape Title II regulation of its
residential local exchange service simply by packaging that service with voice mail." Id.
111 See Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the
Communications Act of 1934, 11 F.C.C.R. 21,905, 77 100-05, at 21,955-58 (1996) [hereinafter Non-
Accounting Safeguards Order] (in general, services involving protocol processing fall within the 1996
Act's definition of "information service"), reconsidered, 12 F.C.C.R 2297, aff'd sub nom. Bell
Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
112 See Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capacity, 13
F.C.C.R. 24,011, 7 35, at 24,029-30 & n.57 (1998); Report to Congress on Universal Service, supra
note 74, 50, at 11,526 & n.106; Non-Accounting Safeguards Order 106, at 21,957-58; see also
Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm'n Rules and Regulations (Computer III), 2 F.C.C.R.
3072, 69 at 3081-82 (1987) (Phase II order), reconsidered, 3 F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988), further
reconsidered, 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989), vacated sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1990).
113 1 am indebted to Stagg Newman for his emphasis of this point.
114 See Report to Congress on Universal Service, supra note 74, 1 74, at 11,537.
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vulnerable, outside the dial-up context. One of the defining characteristics
of IP is that an IP network itself displays no intelligence; it only passes
information transparently from one edge to another. In a phrase, the
network provides only "commodity connectivity.""' 5 All of the intelligence
and enhanced functionality-the storage and manipulation of user
information-takes place at the edges of the networks (that is, either
before or after the information is transmitted from origin to destination)." 16
Thus, simple IP transmission seems like a classic example of
"transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user's choice, without change in the form or content"
that is, telecommunications. Indeed, the Commission has said essentially
that about other packet-based services." 7
The Report to Congress on Universal Service grounds its finding that
Internet access is an information service largely on the fact that Internet
service providers run mail servers, host Web pages, offer Usenet news
feeds, operate caches, and engage in other computer-mediated activities
that go beyond simple transmission of packets. 118 But not all customers
require these services. Where the customer is a corporate intranet, it will
maintain its own mail and Web servers. The Internet access provider likely
will provide nothing except pure transmission and routing of packets
within its internal network and connection to the larger Internet. In such a
case, it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that the ISP is offering
telecommunications: It is providing transport and nothing else.
This suggests some really silly accounting problems. Imagine that an
ISP leases a fat digital transmission link to a network access point. The
carrier leasing that line to the ISP is liable for universal service payments
to the extent the ISP uses that connection to serve dial-up customers,
because the ISP is providing those customers with an information service,
and thus is itself a telecommunications "end user" for universal service
purposes.' 19 At the same time, if the analysis in the preceding paragraph is
correct, the carrier need not pay into the universal service fund to the
extent the ISP uses the same connection to serve corporate customers, for
the ISP is providing telecommunications to those customers and thus is not
an "end user." If nothing else, such a system is administratively
unworkable.
The notion that pure Internet connectivity is "telecommunications"
115 See Isenberg, supra note 4, at 28 ("[AI1 that matters is that the bits sent by your machine
are received by my machine, and vice versa.").
116 See id.
117 See Independent Data Communications Mfrs. Ass'n, 10 F.C.C.R. 13,717 (1995); see also
Deployment of Wireline Servs., 35, at 24,029 & n.56 (citing cases).
118 Report to Congress on Universal Service, supra note 74, 75, at 11,537-39.
119 Universal service contributions are calculated as a percentage of end user revenues. See
47 CFR § 54.709 (1998).
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within the meaning of the 1996 Act, though, is troubling on a more
fundamental level. It expands the scope of services subject to universal
service fund exactions without any policy-oriented understanding of why
that should be necessary or desirable. Put another way, it extends old rules
to the Net without adequate consideration of whether that is a good
thing.
120
C. Why the Telecommunications/Information Service Distinction Doesn't
Work
To understand why the "telecommunications"/"information service"
distinction doesn't work in the IP context, it's useful to look back to
Computer II. The Computer II categories, like their 1996 Act cognates,
focused on service offerings. That is, the things being categorized were
services, rather than (say) equipment or capabilities.' 2' That's a natural
way to divide up the world from a conventional telephony perspective;
those in the world of computer-to-computer communications, though, tend
to use a different set of categories.
The computing world, in thinking about the communications process,
tends to rely on the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, which
organizes that process into "layers."' 2 The physical layer is concerned
with the physical infrastructure over which the information travels;
immediately above that are the data link layer, concerned with the
procedures for transmitting data using a particular technology, *and the
network layer, concerned with routing and the transfer of data among
computers. 123 The transport layer defines the rules for information
exchange and manages the reliable end-to-end delivery of information.
24
The session, presentation, and applications layers focus on user
applications; in particular, the applications layer contains the functionality
120 There are surely good arguments that we should not increase the cost of Internet service
in order to subsidize telephone service. See. e.g., Michael Riordan, Conundrums for
Telecommunications Policy, Remarks to the National Economists Club (May 28, 1998) (transcript on
file with author).
121 See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Computer 11), 77 F.C.C.2d at 419-20; 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (43), (46) (Supp. 111996).
122 The OSI model was developed by the International Standards Organization to provide a
common design framework for communications networks. While the specific protocols developed as
part of the OSI model were not widely adopted (and particular implementations may not follow the
model rigorously), the concepts underlying the model are dominant in the computing world. The
National Research Council followed a similar approach in devising its Open Data Network
architecture: that conceptual model incorporates a "bearer service" layer (sitting on top of the "network
technology" substrate), a "transport" layer, a "middleware" layer, and an "application" layer. See
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REALIZING THE INFORMATION FUTURE 47-51 (1994).
123 See NEWTON, supra note 1, at 519-20.
124 See id.
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for specific services. 125
The service offerings contemplated by Computer II cut across the
layers of the OSI model. For example, the paradigmatic example of basic
service (or "telecommunications") is plain old telephone service (POTS),
designed to enable ordinary voice communication. POTS constitutes a
vertically-integrated intertwining of components from various layers. It
relies on a copper twisted pair infrastructure (the physical layer), organized
into a circuit-switched architecture, with 64-Kbps channels set aside for
each voice signal (data link, network and transport layers). 126 Applications
such as flash hook signaling rely on elements ranging from the bottom
(physical) to the top (applications) layers.127
The Computer HI model in fact contemplated that enhanced services
would be constructed in a layered manner, but it relied on an entirely
different set of layers; its fundamental assumption was that POTS was the
foundation on which enhanced services were built. One created an
enhanced service by taking POTS (or a similar but higher-bandwidth
service provided by the telephone company), using that service to transmit
data, and adding data processing (and thus enhanced functionality). The
underlying POTS transport was subject to regulation; the enhanced
service-which was "enhanced" in the most literal sense-was not. That
made perfect sense in the world of Computer II, back in 1980, and for
years to come; it was perfectly natural for government to seek to regulate
the underlying transport (which was, after all, offered for the most part by
regulated monopolies) while eschewing any control over the
"enhancements." The 1996 Act, as interpreted by the FCC, carried forward
the same model. 2 8
But that key assumption doesn't work in the IP world. IP maintains
sharp separations between the various layers of the OSI model. Different
components of the network are responsible for the physical infrastructure,
the transport of the underlying bits (using Internet protocol), and the
applications (or services) that ride on top. One can write applications
without having to worry at all about the lower layers; one's service will
work over any physical infrastructure and any transport protocol with IP
on it. That means, though, that the foundational assumption of Computer
Il-that an enhanced service is a basic service "plus"-no longer holds
true.
In the IP world, there are no vertically-integrated service offerings
such as POTS that can be seen as the "foundation" of more elaborate
125 See id.
126 See supra text following note 2.
127 I owe this point to Stagg Newman.
128 As the 1996 Act put it, a firm offers information services "via telecommunications." 47
U.S.C. § 153(20) (Supp. 11 1996).
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offerings. An IP-based service offering that transmits information
transparently does not play the same role in the IP world as POTS does in
the conventional telephony world, because it does not provide transport for
other, more elaborate IP-based service offerings. Rather, the only
foundation of any IP-based service offering is the underlying IP transport.
As applied to the IP world, the basic/enhanced distinction does not
serve the goal of allowing government to regulate underlying transport
while leaving the "enhancements" to the marketplace. Instead, it creates
the anomalous result that a service is subject to regulation if it offers little
functionality, but free from regulation if it offers somewhat more. 29 It
creates the anomalous result that two services, each deemed information
services when viewed in isolation, may combine in a distributed
environment to form an end-to-end offering magically deemed
telecommunications. 130 If regulators wish to carry forward into the IP
world Computer II's goal of attaching regulatory obligations to underlying
transport, they need to aim those obligations more precisely.
D. Universal Service Redux
How should we rethink universal service support in the modern
telecommunications world? The simplest and best way to fund universal
service would be to take the money from general tax revenues. That would
eliminate any arbitrage or distortions caused by taxing one class of
communications activity and not another. That approach, though, would
not be politically feasible. One alternative approach might be to revise the
universal service payment obligation so as to associate it not with service
provision, but with the physical facilities along which the information,
moves.' 3' Computer II, after all, sought to impose regulatory obligations
on the underlying transport, and it is the physical layer that is associated
with underlying transport in the most fundamental sense. A payment
obligation tied to the ownership of qualifying facilities could apply without
regard to whether the information moving via those facilities was in digital
or analog form, or was packet- or circuit-switched.
129 See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
131 The FCC in the Report to Congress on Universal Service took this approach when it
mused about the possibility of requiring only
the actual facilities owners . . . to contribute to universal service mechanisms on
the revenues they receive. It is facilities owners that, in a real sense, provide the
crucial telecommunications inputs underlying Internet service. If universal service
contribution obligations, in the context of the Internet backbone, were based on
facilities ownership rather than on end-user revenues, then firms purchasing
capacity from the facilities owners would still contribute indirectly, through prices
that recover the facilities owners' contributions. This matter deserves further
consideration.
Report to Congress on Universal Service, supra note 74, 1 72, at 11,535-36 (1998).
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Such an approach would have a variety of advantages. We could
avoid the problems associated with determining which providers are
providing "telecommunications," making them subject to the assessment,
and which are providing "information services," leaving them exempt.
Ownership of facilities would trigger the obligation without regard to the
nature of the traffic moving over those facilities. Such a rule might be able
to do what the Computer HI distinction itself can no longer do: It might
effectuate Computer HI's goal of imposing regulatory obligations on
underlying transport, without burdening the service components higher up
the protocol stack. It would thus vindicate Computer II's still-valid
judgment that, in order not to retard innovation, we should not impose
regulatory costs on the new, still unfolding functionalities made possible
by the marriage of silicon to data transmission.
1 32
Such an approach would be aesthetically appealing: To the extent that
the high-cost fund is designed to support the availability of physical
infrastructure throughout the nation, 33 it provides a nice symmetry to
impose the associated costs on physical infrastructure. More
consequentially, the approach would be technology-neutral. Based on the
assumption that a bit is a bit is a bit, no matter how transmitted, it would
address the concerns of those who fear that a shift of telephone traffic
away from circuit-switched voice to packet-switched data will undermine
the entire subsidy structure. This seems important; in the ultimate analysis,
it is hard to justify a regulatory scheme that assigns different consequences
to provision of the same transport using different technologies. Such a
scheme leads providers to make technology choices on the basis of
regulatory arbitrage, not on the basis of which technology is most efficient,
powerful, or inexpensive in a particular context.
Under a facilities-based approach, the facilities owners (telephone
companies and others) from which Internet service providers and
backbone providers lease data lines, as well as any Internet service
providers and backbone providers owning their own transmission
facilities, would make payments to the Universal Service Fund. One would
expect facilities owners to pass on costs to Internet service providers and
backbone providers leasing capacity from them; backbone providers to
pass on costs to Internet service providers paying them for transit; and
Internet service providers to pass on costs to their subscribers. 34 All this
132 A facilities-based approach, however, would not be appropriate in connection with all
Title 11 obligations. Most importantly, one could not sensibly apply a facilities-based approach to the
tariffing rules carried over from railroad regulation. Similarly, one could not apply a facilities-based
approach to the requirement that carriers safeguard customer privacy.
133 See supra text accompanying note 82.
134 In suggesting this approach, I am assuming that facilities owners would in fact be able to
pass on their costs. To the extent that they could not-so that the obligation would weigh heavily on
facilities owners but only lightly on lessors-the proposal would have the effect of singling out a
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would likely increase the share of universal service obligations ultimately
paid by consumers of Internet-based services. That without more, though,
should not be a dispositive objection. Conventional and IP networks are
merging, so that it will no longer work simply to seek to insulate IP
networks from regulation. 135 Rather, the goal should be to find ways to
recast existing regulation (where it should not simply be jettisoned for
circuit-switched and packet-switched networks alike) to be technology-
neutral and IP-friendly, to make sense in an increasingly packet-switched
world.
136
The FCC would have to overcome considerable practical difficulties,
though, before it could adopt a facilities-based approach. How would the
agency determine the amount of the fee paid'by facilities owners? The
agency currently sets universal service assessments as a percentage of the
revenues a firm receives from end users for telecommunications., 37 If the
agency tied the fact of the payment obligation to physical facilities
ownership, then it could logically tie the amount of the assessment to
revenues only by looking to that limited set of revenues corresponding to
physical transmission. Yet typically, a telecommunications (or information
service) provider provides its customers with a combination of physical
infrastructure, transport, and associated features and services, not just
physical facilities. The revenues it receives are for the combination. Where
a provider itself owns transmission facilities (rather than purchasing raw
transmission from a third party) and provides its customers with an
integrated service, it is not clear how one can. isolate that portion of its
revenues that correspond to raw transmission.
3 1
Tying universal service obligations to a metric other than revenues
could be at least as precarious. One possibility might be to make the fee
particular industry segment without policy justification, and would be rather more problematic.
135 An illustration of this convergence can be seen in the work of the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute, which, in developing standards for computer-to-phone IP
telephony, is considering an approach under which E.164 telephone numbers with a special country
code would correspond to Internet addresses. See E-mail from Professor Marvin Sirbu to the
telecomreg mailing list (Sept. 3, 1998) (on file with author).
136 But see Riordan, supra note 120 (arguing that requiring Internet providers to pay
universal service fees to sustain high telephone penetration "is exactly backwards"). Indeed, to the
extent that high-cost subsidies today are too high (because they are designed to equalize the prices of
telecommunications services in rural and urban areas without regard to whether less-subsidized rural
prices would be a threat to telephone penetration, see supra note 82), requiring IP-based service
providers to contribute to those subsidies would only make a bad situation worse. On the other hand,
universal service subsidies do not only support voice telephony; a consumer can use the local loop
made affordable by universal service support for Internet as well as circuit-switched telephony
services.
137 See 47 CFR §§ 54.709 (1998).
138 See Kevin Werbach, How to Price a Bit, RELEASE 1.0, June 22, 1998, at I (the "cost to
send a bit of data across the Internet. .. is surprisingly complex. Networks involve a mix of fixed and
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proportional to the raw bandwidth of a firm's transmission facilities.
Increasingly, however, carriers are creating bandwidth through improved
multiplexing techniques rather than laying new fiber.'3 9 It would be
undesirable if a firm's implementation of such techniques led to a massive
jump in its universal service obligations; that might discourage desirable
experimentation and capacity expansion. Nor would it always be clear, in
the case of innovative technologies, how much bandwidth to associate
with a given facility. Indeed, for some technologies (say, unlicensed
wireless spread spectrum), the notion of the bandwidth associated with a
facility seems essentially meaningless.
40
These difficulties might push us back to a solution based on actual or
imputed revenues. Conceivably, a second-best solution might limit the
universal service assessment to owners of transmission facilities; require
those entities to make payments based on actual revenues in cases in which
they provide leased lines or the equivalent; and require them to make
payments based on the imputed value of the raw transmission they provide
to themselves when they offer other services.
1 41
In the end, though, any attempt to vindicate Computer HI principles in
the context of universal service obligations may be misdirected. The
universal service obligation, after all, is today essentially a tax supporting
a particular government program.1 42 Under current rules, a firm may
139 See Erik Kreifeldt, NFOEC '98: DWDM Hot Topic, But Not Magic Bullet (visited Sept.
17, 1998) <http://news.fiberopticsonline.com/news-analysis/1 9980917-5443.html>.
140 See generally Operation of Unlicensed Nil Devices in the 5 GHz Frequency Range, 12
F.C.C.R. 1576 (1997), reconsidered, 13 F.C.C.R. 14,355 (1998). (amending rules to permit fixed,
point-to-point Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure ("U-NIl") devices in the 5.725-5.825
GHz band). Alternatively, it might be possible to impose a fee based on a firm's asset investment in
physical facilities, or on other such proxies.
141 1 have not so far, in this Article, addressed the legal constraints on these approaches; any
solution the FCC adopts, absent statutory amendment, would have to be consistent with the
Telecommunications Act, which mandates that "[elvery telecommunications carrier... provid[ing]
interstate telecommunications services" contribute to universal service mechanisms "on an equitable
and nondiscriminatory basis." 47 U.S.C. §254(d) (Supp. 111996) A facilities-based approach would be
vulnerable to the legal challenge that it did not require "every" carrier to contribute. Alternatively, one
might argue that under this approach non-facilities-based carriers would contribute (albeit indirectly)
through the prices they would pay for transmission, since those prices would reflect the facilities-based
carriers' direct payments. Indeed, if the statute were read to impose an inflexible requirement that all
carriers contribute directly, the current approach would not comply, since it is only the provision of
telecommunications to end users that triggers the payment obligation. A carrier that does not serve
end users is not required to contribute today.
The approach described in text might also be vulnerable to the argument that the Commission
has no authority to impose payment obligations on facilities-based information service providers.
Here, though, the Report to Congress on Universal Service provides the answer: Such a firm should be
deemed to be providing telecommunications to itself, thus it should fall within the FCC's authority to
require "[a]ny ... provider of interstate telecommunications ... to contribute to the preservation and
advancement of universal service if the public interest so requires." 47 U.S.C. § 254(d); see Report to
Congress on Universal Service, supra note 75, at 11,534-535.
142 The Fifth Circuit is now considering whether the USF contribution obligation (or any part
of it) is inconsistent with the constitutional command that "[aill bills for raising Revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 1. It would be incongruous,
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receive universal service support for serving customers in high-cost areas,
if it provides access to the public switched telephone network sufficient to
support analog voice transmission, with touch-tone signaling and access to
emergency services, operator services and directory assistance. 43 This
reflects the conventional understanding of universal service: Voice access
to the public switched telephone network is seen as essential to public
safety and participation in society and democracy, and every network
subscriber benefits when that network is expanded. 44
For historical and political reasons, we have chosen to fund this
program not out of general tax revenues, but through exactions from a
class of communications service providers. We should nonetheless be
guided by tax policy considerations. Those considerations suggest that in
defining the class of contributors, our lodestar should not be Computer II,
but rather these more general principles: Any definition (1) should be
adequately broad; (2) should not discourage development and deployment
of new technology; and (3) should not introduce obvious distortions-
which is to say, that it should treat substitutable services similarly.
It would not make sense, therefore, to limit the universe of universal
service contributors to providers of supported services. Such a rule would
tax the provision of conventional analog voice telephony connections
while leaving untouched other data pathways that consumers could use to
secure similar functionality. Indeed, there is no obvious reason to limit the
universe of contributors to actors regulated under Title II. Under the
current regulatory structure, only telecommunications carriers need
contribute to the universal service fund. Providers of cable service need
not make payments to the fund, because cable service is not defined as
"telecommunications"-it is governed by Title VI, rather than Title II, of
the Communications Act. 141 Yet if the FCC is not to pose distortions,
statutory pigeonholes should not overcome considerations of functionality
and market substitutability. Under a technology-neutral approach, all
services functionally similar to those subject to a USF obligation (or the
facilities used to provide them) should be in play.
however, if the FCC were found to have overstepped constitutional boundaries merely by following
Congress's direction to refashion existing implicit subsidies into explicit ones.
143 See supra text accompanying note 88.
144 See Francois Bar & Annemarie Munk Riis, From Welfare to Innovation: Toward A New
Rationale for Universal Service 14 (Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
145 See generally BARBARA ESBIN, INTERNET OVER CABLE: DEFINING THE FUTURE IN
TERMS OF THE PAST (Federal Communications Commission OPP Working Paper No. 30, 1998)
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III. The Internet and Access Charges
The Universal Service Fund is not the only-or even the most
important-federal subsidy mechanism. Telephone pricing today is
characterized by a tangle of implicit as well as explicit cross subsidies,
46
and the implicit subsidies are larger than the explicit.1 47 The most
important such subsidy mechanism, on the federal level, is interstate
access pricing. 148 In part, as noted above, those charges are designed to
compensate the local telephone companies for the costs the call imposes
on their networks. Historically, however, they have also included a
substantial implicit subsidy component. 49 As a result, access charges
today are an opaque blend of forward-looking economic cost, historic
costs, and subsidies intended to depress local rates. ° The FCC is seeking
to remove the subsidy element from access charges, and to drive those
charges down to a level more nearly approximating forward-looking
cost."' 1
Where should the Internet, and IP networks generally, fit within the
access-charge structure? As in the universal service context, I suggest that
access-charge obligations need not turn on the
telecommunications/information service distinction in the long run at all.
While universal service payments are pure subsidy, access charges include
a cost-recovery element. There is no compelling reason why, in the long
run, information service providers should not pay charges tied to the costs
they impose on the local exchange. Rather, it makes sense to move access
charges towards cost for telecommunications and information service
providers alike.
A. The Status Quo
Currently, information service providers do not pay access charges.'
52
That exemption should continue. As the FCC has explained, it would make
little sense to require Internet service providers to pay interstate access
charges as currently constituted:
The access charge system includes non-cost-based rates and
146 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
147 See Universal Service Order, supra note 9, 10-11, at 8784.
148 See supra text accompanying note 79.
149 See id.
150 See Universal Service Order, supra note 9 12-14, at 8785.
151 See Access Charge Reform, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982, 5-9, at 15,986-87 (1997) (first report
and order), aff'd Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998); supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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inefficient rate structures .... [There is] no reason to extend this
regime to an additional class of users . . . . The mere fact that
providers of information services use incumbent [local exchange
carrier] networks to receive calls from their customers does not
mean that such providers should be subject to an interstate
regulatory system designed for circuit-switched interexchange
voice telephony.'
I suggested in the previous section of this Article that attempts simply to
insulate IP networks from regulation are doomed to fail. But that is not to
say that one should blindly extend old rules to IP networks, no matter how
inefficient or ill-advised the regulation is. The FCC is currently seeking to
remove implicit universal service subsidies from interstate access
charges. 154 Against that backdrop, it would not be sensible to extend those
subsidies to a new class of users, imposing distortions and inefficiencies
on IP networks.
B. Beyond the Status Quo
But the current exemption is not the end of the story-access charges,
after all, recover costs as well as generate subsidies. In the absence of
access charges or some comparable payment, there is no mechanism to
cause Internet service providers to pay any congestion costs they impose
on the local exchange. Any traffic-sensitive costs they impose, rather than
being reflected in their own rates, are assigned to the local jurisdiction and
spread among all local ratepayers.'
The extent to which Internet service providers impose costs on the
local exchange is hotly debated.'56 The FCC's Local Competition Order,
though, estimated a cost of .2 to .4 cents ($.002 to $.004) per minute as a
default proxy for the traffic-sensitive component of local switching.
157
This figure, small as it is, suggests the potential for a mismatch between
prices and economic costs where ISPs receive huge numbers of calls over
the public switched network, since typically such a call is free to both
caller (paying flat residential rates) and ISP (under standard local business
rates, paying a flat fee for incoming calls). The matter is not simple-local
153 Access Charge Reform, II F.C.C.R 21,354, 288, at 21,480 (1996) (notice of proposed
rulemaking) (footnote omitted). The agency confirmed this tentative conclusion in Access Charge
Reform, 12. F.C.C.R 15,982, 1 344-45, at 16,133 (1997) (first report and order), aff'd, Southwest Bell
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998).
154 See Access Charge Reform, 12 F.C.C.R. TT 5-8, at 15,986.
155 See KEVIN WERBACH, DIGITAL TORNADO: THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY 62-63 (Federal Communications Commission OPP Working Paper No. 29, 1997).
156 See id. at 58-61.
157 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of 1996,
11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 811, at 15,905, IT 1055-1061, at 16,024-26 (1996).
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switching costs appear to be essentially congestion costs,' and the
interested parties fiercely dispute the degree to which Internet access in
fact generates congestion on the local network.159 The associated costs
may well be zero except during peak periods. 60 But it seems plausible that
Internet access may impose some costs on the local exchange not reflected
in the rates ISPs pay.
161
The legitimacy of any mismatch between prices and economic costs
in this area is usually debated in federalism terms. ISPs insist that the local
lines they buy fall within the intrastate jurisdiction, so that it is up to state
regulatory commissions to decide whether there is an impermissible
disparity between prices and costs. They argue that, in receiving large
numbers of incoming calls while making few outgoing calls, ISPs are
situated no differently from a variety of other local businesses (pizza
parlors, say), and should not be singled out for different treatment. 62
That argument seems unsatisfactory, though, on a variety of levels.
To the extent that the bulk of the inefficiencies and subsidies that
characterize conventional telephony are built into the intrastate pricing
structure, we should be wary of too quick a finding that any IP-based
service is properly regulated as part of that structure. Moreover, the
158 See WERBACH, supra note 155, at 58-63.
159 Local exchange carriers have asserted that Internet traffic commonly gives rise to
congestion at the telephone switch serving the Internet service provider. See id. at 58. A local
exchange carrier switch cannot simultaneously support connections for all users of the switch. Id.
Rather, there is one call path through the switch for every four to eight users. Because calls by users to
Internet service providers tend to be longer than voice calls, but still-like all calls on the circuit-
switched public telephone network-tie up an end-to-end call path for the duration of the call, local
exchange carriers claim that heavy Internet usage will increasingly lead to situations in which all
available paths through the switch are in use and additional calls seeking a call path through the switch
will be blocked. See id. at 58-60.
Internet service providers, however, sharply dispute the extent to which switch congestion is a
serious problem. See id. at 60. A study commissioned by the Internet Access Coalition concludes that
incidents of congestion have been localized, are easily corrected, and are primarily attributable to
inadequate planning and inefficient engineering by the local exchange carriers. See Id.
'160 See generally Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions, II F.C.C.R. 1064,
at 16,028-29 (discussing peak and non-peak pricing plans for reciprocal compensation).
161 The question whether lSPs impose uncompensated costs on the local exchange is
different from the question whether they impose uncompensated costs on local exchange carriers. In
Access Charge Reform, the Commission found insufficient evidence that local exchange carriers
suffered losses by virtue of Internet use. See Access Charge Reform, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982, 346, at 16,
133-34 (1997) (first report and order), affd, Southwest Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir.
1998). It noted that the carriers received revenue not only from ISPs' connections to the local
exchange, but also from consumers' purchases of second lines and ISPs' purchases of leased lines to
provision their internal networks. Moreover, the popularity of the Internet generated revenue through
subscriptions to incumbent local exchange carriers own Internet access services. Id. These
considerations suggest that uncompensated costs in one area are balanced by monopoly profits in
another. They do not speak to whether the rates paid by ISPs are related to the costs they impose
(much less to whether either the profits local exchange carriers earn or the costs they incur are passed
on to the ratepaying public).
162 See id. 345, at 16,133. ("[C]ommenters point out [that] many of the characteristics of
ISP traffic (such as large numbers of incoming calls to Internet service providers) may be shared by
other classes of business customers."). Id.
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federalism argument seems wrong: ISPs provide what is in predominant
part an interstate information service. 63 Customers use ISP facilities to
exchange traffic with e-mail correspondents, Usenet news participants,
Web sites, FTP servers and other persons or devices without regard to
jurisdictional boundaries.164 Indeed, the entire point of Internet access is to
enable communication with persons and sites ranged across the globe.
65
Dialup Internet access, to be sure, is an information service under the
definitions discussed earlier in this paper, not a telecommunications
service like long-distance POTS. But it is by no means clear why that
should be relevant to a charge designed to recover actual costs imposed on
the local exchange. As noted above, when the FCC established the access
charge system in 1983, it initially contemplated that both basic and
enhanced service providers would pay access charges. 66 Even in reversing
that initial judgment, it had no doubt that enhanced service providers
"employ exchange service for jurisdictionally interstate
communications."'167 Because the Internet traffic passing over the local
phone lines connecting end users and ISPs is predominantly
jurisdictionally interstate, federal policy should govern how the costs
163 The FCC made this clear in GTE Tel. Operating Cos., 13 F.C.C.R. 22,466, 22-26, at
22,478-80 (1998).
164 That traffic is sometimes stored on ISP computers along the way, but that storage (in a
web cache, Usenet news feed, or mail queue) is simply an intermediate step in a larger journey. See
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996, CC Docket Nos.
96-98 & 99-68, 1998 F.C.C. LEXIS 821, 12-13, at *19-23 (Feb. 26, 1999). The Commi'n has stated
that it "analyses the totality of the communication when determining [it's] jurisdictional nature..." Id
13, at *22.
165 The "key to (federal] jurisdiction" is the interstate movement of communications traffic.
Petition for Emergency Relief & Declaratory Ruling Filed by the BellSouthCorp., 7 F.C.C.R. 1619,
1621 (1992) (quoting New York Telephone Co. v. FCC, 631 F.2d 1059, 1066 (2d Cir. 1980)). In
characterizing a service as interstate or intrastate, thus, we look to the nature of the traffic, or "the
actual uses to which the property is put." Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 151 (1930); see
also, e.g., California v. FCC, 567 F.2d 84, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (explaining that the regulatory
characterization depends on "the nature of the communications that pass through the facilities"); MTS
& WATS Mkt. Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, 713 n.58 (1983) (memorandum and order), aff'd in
relevant part sub noma. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (1984)
(explaining that the nature of communication determines jurisdiction).
In important respects, Internet access traffic is best characterized as jurisdictionally mixed. Not
all ISP services are necessarily interstate; some users may make such limited use of the Internet that
they never interact with data bits that have crossed, or will cross, a state line. It is impossible,
however, to identify those users, or to separate them out, by examining Interet traffic; packet-
switched networks by their nature are less amenable than circuit-switched networks to such partition.
The status of the traffic as jurisdictionally mixed gives the FCC some discretion over its jurisdictional
and separations treatment. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 543 (8th Cir. 1998).
166 Both basic and enhanced service providers were "users of access service," in that they
obtained "local exchange services or facilities which are used ... for the purpose of completing
interstate calls .... MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 77-78, at 711. The FCC's initial
order defined "access service" to include "services and facilities ... provided for the origination or
termination of any interstate or foreign enhanced service .... MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, 93
F.C.C.2d 241, 344 (third report and order) (emphasis added), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. National
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (1984).
167 MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 83, at 715.
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associated with that traffic are allocated.168
It has been suggested that the fact that ISPs need not pay all of the
costs they incur may lead to concrete distortions. Specifically, the most
efficient way to move bits from end users to ISPs may well be over digital,
packet-switched links that bypass the public switched telephone network
entirely (or that use customers' local loops, but leave the network before
hitting a telephone switch). Yet ISPs' freedom from access charges could
motivate them to stay on the circuit-switched network even where that is
the less efficient solution. If ISPs were required to pay the economic costs
of their connections to the circuit-switched network, the argument runs,
then competitive local exchange carriers would have incentives to offer,
and ISPs to buy, more efficient packet-switched connections. Incumbent
local exchange carriers might well then roll out their own comparable
services in response.1
69
On the other hand, the scenario just sketched out is vulnerable to a
variety of objections. First, it appears that end-user demand for Digital
Subscriber Line and other packet-switched services, and competition from
ISPs affiliated with incumbent local exchange carriers and cable operators,
are driving ISPs to seek packet-switched connections in any event. It is by
no means clear that ISPs' low rates for connection to the local exchange
are significantly affecting ISP's and consumers' choices in this regard.
Second, the reasoning set out above assumes the existence of local
competition. That is, it assumes that some firm is in fact offering packet-
switched access in competition with the incumbent local exchange carrier.
In the absence of local competition, reforming the rates paid by ISPs
accomplishes nothing except that ISPs pay higher prices and incumbent
local exchange carriers keep the money, because the monopoly providers
have little incentive to develop ways to move the Internet traffic off the
circuit-switched network.
Nor would it suffice simply to postpone the imposition of any new
charges on ISPs until after local competition emerges. There is a chicken-
and-egg problem: One of the most important factors affecting the
willingness of local exchange carriers (competitive or incumbent) to roll
out packet-switched connectivity for ISPs is ISPs' willingness to buy that
connectivity. Yet current regulation diminishes ISPs' incentive to do so.
One answer might be for the FCC to announce now that ISPs will be
required to pay a federally-tariffed charge for connectivity to the circuit-
168 But see Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of
1996, 28-30, at *44-47 (explaining that traffic passing from an end user to an originating local
exchange carrier (LEC), to a second local exchange carrier, to an Internet service provider, bound for
the Internet, is largely jurisdictionally interstate, and that any inter-LEC compensation in connection
with that traffic should be governed by a federal rule, but that the best rule would simply effectuate
negotiated agreements between the carriers).
169 See WERBACH, supra note 155, at 72.
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switched network, reflecting actual economic costs, upon the emergence of
local competition in the relevant market. This would encourage
competitive local exchange carriers to roll out packet-switched services
directed at ISPs, knowing that the imposition of the federally tariffed
charge on circuit-switched connectivity would level the playing field and
make those services more attractive. The FCC's actual moves, though,
have been in the opposite direction. The agency has stressed that "the FCC
has no intention of assessing per-minute charges on Internet traffic or
changing the way consumers obtain and pay for access to the Internet."'
' 70
Finally, tying the new charge to the existence of competition might be
difficult in other ways. How could the agency determine the actual
economic costs imposed by ISP circuit-switched connections on the local
network? To the extent that it required local competition as a prerequisite
for any regulatory change, how would it measure competition? The FCC's
experience with the 1996 Act's famously problematic directive' that the
Bell Operating Companies may provide in-region long-distance services
only after they open up their local markets to competition, offers no
grounds for optimism that this process would be any easier.
Conclusion
The distinction between regulated "telecommunications" and
unregulated "information services" is at the center of the 1996
Telecommunications Act. That distinction, though, is rooted in the
conventional telephone network; it doesn't work in the IP world. We need
to develop new ways of reconciling old telephone regulation with new IP
networks. For example, regulators might consider associating universal
service payment obligations not with. the provision of
"telecommunications," but with the ownership of transmission facilities.
While the exemption of information service providers from access charges
should continue, it may make sense in the long run for information service
providers to pay charges tied to any costs they impose on the local
exchange. Ultimately, we will have to reshape the rules governing both old
and new technology if we are to find a structure that works.
170 Fact Sheet: No Consumer Per-Minute Charges to Access 1SPs (visited Apr. 22 1999)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Factsheets/nominute.html>.
171 The 1996 Act provides that a Bell Operating Company may provide in-region long-
distance service only when it satisfies a fourteen-point checklist demonstrating that it has opened its
local market to competition. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B). So far, the FCC has rejected every such
petition filed with it, finding that the checklist was not yet satisfied. The process has been highly
complex, and highly contentious.
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